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Jensen: Criminal Procedure

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
AFTER LOWENFIELD: THE ALLEN
CHARGE IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Shawn B. Jensen*

When a jury becomes deadlocked and cannot reach a verdict for lack of unanimity, federal district courts often attempt
to break the jury's deadlock by giving a supplemental instruc·tion, usually called an "Allen charge," which urges the jurors to
reconsider their views in order to attain a unanimous verdict.
This article reviews the use of this type of supplemental instruction in the Ninth Circuit. Principally the article analyzes the approach previously taken by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in upholding Allen charges. It then evaluates the impact of
Lowenfield v. Phelps, the recent Supreme Court case addressing
the subject. The article concludes by suggesting how the Ninth
Circuit would review an Allen charge on appeal in determining
whether the charge should be upheld.
EVOLUTION OF THE ALLEN CHARGE IN THE NINTH
CIRCUIT

I.

Juries which fail to reach a verdict because they are deadlocked are often given an "Allen charge." The "Allen charge"
gets its name from a case decided nearly a century ago, Allen v.
United States/ where the Supreme Court upheld a supplemental jury instruction which urged the members of a deadlocked
• B.A. Montana State University, 1982; J.D. Gonzaga University School of Law,
1986. Member of the Washington, Idaho, and District of Columbia Bars. Former law
clerk to the Hon. J. Blaine Anderson, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 1986-88.
1. 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
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jury to reconsider their views in order to reach a verdict. 2 In its
simplest forin, an "Allen charge"3 is a supplemental jury instruction given after jurors have stopped deliberating because
they cannot agree on a verdict and further deliberation appears
to be superfluous. The Allen charge, or a similar supplemental
instruction,· urges jurors to reconsider their views so that a verdict can be attained. When the instruction is given in a criminal
case and the result is a conviction because the deadlock which
would have resulted in a hung jury with no verdict has been
transformed into a verdict of guilty, the principal contention on
appeal is that the verdict was unconstitutionally coerced. Ii
One of the earliest Ninth Circuit cases in which a supplemental instruction was challenged as being too coercive was Peterson u. United States,S where five co-defendants charged" with
buying and receiving stolen property. Ironically, Peterson was a
retrial after the first resulted in a hung jury. On retrial, defendant Peterson was found guilty while the remaining defendants
2. [d. at 501.
3. The "Allen charge" gets its name from the Supreme Court decision of Allen v.
United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). It is also commonly referred to as a "dynamite
charge" or "nitroglycerine charge" because it blasts a verdict out of the jury. See ABA
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING To TRIAL
By JURY, 151 (1968).
4. The terms "supplemental instruction," "Allen-type instruction," "Allen charge"
and "modified Allen charge" are used interchangeably. However, such a supplemental
instruction mayor may not use the identical language approved in Allen. In fact, the
Allen opinion did not reiterate the lengthy language contained in the supplemental instruction. Instead, the opinion simply cited to Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. 1
(1851), saying the instruction was taken literally from that case. Allen 164 U.S. at 501.
Today, in both civil and criminal trials, courts generally refer to an "Allen charge" as
any type of instruction, given after the jury has had some time to deliberate, which in
some way urges the jurors to reach a verdict while cautioning them not to give up an
"honest conviction" about the defendant's guilt or innocence. The instruction may be a
few short sentences or several pages in length. See e.g., Seawell v. United States, 550
F.2d 1159, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977)(Seawell I)(form of Allen instruction used was almost
one thousand words in length); see also DEVITT & BLACKMAR. FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE
AND INSTRUCTIONS. § 18.14 (3d ed. 1977 & Supp. 1987).
5. While an Allen-type instruction may be given in a civil case, this article evaluates
the use of this type of instruction only in criminal cases. In a criminal case the instruction would primarily implicate the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury and the
fifth amendment right to due process of law. In a civil case the constitutional claims
would primarily rest upon the due process clause of the fifth amendment and the seventh amendment right to a trial by jury. However, the Supreme Court has analyzed Allen instructions under the same standard without respect to the constitutional basis
alleged.
6. 213 F. 920 (9th Cir. 1914).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss1/8

2

Jensen: Criminal Procedure

1989]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

77

were acquitted. 7 The trial took three days. When the jury had
reached a deadlock after nearly two days of deliberation, the district court took a poll to determine how the jury was divided. 8 It
then gave a supplemental instruction which included the admonitions that this was the second trial, justice was expensive to
the government and that with their seven-to-five deadlock the
five jurors should seriously inquire whether there was a reasonable doubt when the other seven jurors had no doubt. 9 A guilty
verdict was announced less than one hour after the supplemental instruction was given. 1o On appeal the Ninth Circuit overturned the conviction. Without considering the Supreme Court's
decision in Allen, the Ninth Circuit found that the statements
included in the supplemental instruction were "plainly coercive."ll Specifically, the court found the instruction was unduly
coercive because it did not caution the jurors against yielding
honest conclusions of innocence and incorrectly stated that the
government had a "right" to a verdict.12 The court also considered two other factors in determining that the instruction was
too coercive: first, the complexity of the case, with the court
finding the crime of buying and receiving stolen property to be
easy to understand; and second, the length of deliberations after
the supplemental instruction, with less than one hour being very
brief. 18
Peterson must be read in light of Suslak v. United States,14
which was decided just seven days earlier and should be regarded as a companion case. In Suslak a supplemental instruction was upheld despite the fact that the district court itself
took the initiative to recall the jury to give the charge. 16 The
complexity of the case and the length of subsequent deliberations were not considered. Instead, the decision to affirm the
guilty verdict was based exclusively on the language used in the
supplemental charge. The instruction in Suslak cautioned the
jurors not to "take an arbitrary stand to acquit or convict a
7. Id. at 921.
8. Id. at 924.
9.Id.
10. Id. at 926.
11. Id. at 924.
12. Id. at 925.
13. [d. at 925-26.
14. 213 F. 913 (9th Cir. 1914).
15. Id. at 919.
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man."16 This exclusive rationale was inconsistent with Peterson
which required the complexity of the case and the length of subsequent deliberations to also be considered.
Shea u. United States,17 which followed Peterson and Suslak, added even more confusion to the use of supplemental instructions. In upholding a supplemental instruction, Shea explicitly relied on Allen, reasoning that the authority of the
Supreme Court controlled. IS Shea had argued that the guilty
verdict was nevertheless unduly coerced because the instruction
was the result of the district court's own initiative rather than
the jurors" announcement that they were deadlocked. 19 However,
the court found the instruction's content, as opposed to context,
was the determinative factor. 2o Peterson was distinguished on
the ground that there the district court made the fatal mistake
of inquiring as to how the jurors were divided.21 In this, it would
appear that if the district court inquired about the jury's numerical division by polling the jury, the jurors in the minority would
be singled out and therefore were more susceptible to the coercive effect of a supplemental instruction.

Seven years later, the Supreme Court directly addressed the
issue of jury polling in Brasfield u. United States. 22 In Brasfield,
when the jurors reached deadlock, the district court judge asked
the jurors how they were divided. When they stated, "nine to
three," further deliberation was ordered and a guilty verdict resulted. 23 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, reasoning
that when juror polling was conducted, coercion was much more
likely to exist. 24
16. [d. at 919. Suslak should also be read for its portrayal of the early western mining days. Suslak was convicted of transporting a woman to Butte, Montana for immoral
purposes. The testimony was colorful, with the prosecutrix stating that she entered a life
of open prostitution soon after coming to Butte, and that having gotten the reputation of
a harlot, she thought she might as well live the life and make some money. [d. at 916.
17. 260 F. 807 (9th Cir. 1919).
18. [d. at 809.
19. [d.

20. [d. at 808-09.
21. [d. at 809.
22. 272 U.S. 448 (1926).
23. [d. at 455.
24. [d. at 455. See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
459-62 (1978)(jury foreman referred to the jury's deadlock during an ex parte meeting
with the judge, with the strong likelihood that the foreman carried away the impression
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Thirty years after Brasfield the Ninth Circuit again upheld
a modified Allen instruction in Hudson v. United States,2r.
under the exclusive rationale that the supplemental instruction
contained a "correct statement of the law."26 Hudson therefore
became the cornerstone decision which established that a proper
supplemental instruction in effect consisted of one element-advising the jurors to reconsider their views but not to
give up their "honest convictions."27 The court relegated the
complexity of the case, the length of deliberations, whether the
charge may have been directed at particular jurors, and the additional language which may have been included in the charge,
to insignificant considerations. 28 While this analysis was contrary to Suslak and Peterson, subsequent cases reaffirmed the
Hudson approach. As long as the supplemental instruction or
Allen charge contained the "magic words," i.e., the admonition
that jurors in the minority should not give up an honest or conscientious position on guilt or innocence, it was upheld. 29
In short, the Ninth Circuit came to uphold Allen-type instructions based on the "magic words" alone. While this was
consistent with the narrow holding of Allen, it did little to address other factors which clearly indicated coercion of jurors in
the minority despite the content of the instruction, such as the
complexity of the case in relation to the length of deliberations,
use of vociferous language by the jurors in describing the deadlock and the length of deliberations after the supplemental instruction was given.
A change came in Powell v. United States,30 where a conviction was reversed where use of a supplemental instruction
caused juror coercion. 31 But, the important aspect of Powell is
that the judge wanted a verdict one way or the other).
25. 238 F.2d 167 (9th Cir. 1956).
26. [d. at 173.
27. [d.
28. [d.

29. See Miracle v. United States, 411 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (instruction emphasized that each juror should arrive at his own decision); Dearinger v. United
States, 378 F.2d 346 (9th Cir.)(instruction told jurors not to surrender a conscientious
conviction), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 855 (1967); Christy v. United States, 261 F.2d 357 (9th
Cir. 1958)(instruction included warning to the jurors not to surrender conscientious conviction), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 919 (1959).
30. 347 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1965).
31. [d. at 158.
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that no "additional" supplemental instruction was given. Instead the district court simply reread one of the original instructions which delineated the elements of the crime charged. 82 A
guilty verdict was reached five minutes thereafter. The Ninth
Circuit reversed the conviction, stating that the test for reviewing a supplemental charge was "whether the charge taken as a
whole was such as to confuse or leave an erroneous impression
on the minds of the jurors."88 As a result, Powell stands as a
case upon which convicted defendants may rely to overturn a
guilty verdict, if they can show clear coercion from the factual
context despite the content of the language used in the supplemental instruction.
The salient fact showing coercion is of course the time
elapsed between when the supplemental instruction is given and
the return of the verdict. However, Powell was decided shortly
before the Supreme Court rendered its two page opinion in Jenkins v. United States. 84 In Jenkins a conviction was reversed
where the district court's response to the jurors sending a note
indicating they were unable to agree on a verdict was to tell
them, "You have got to reach a decision in this case."811 Presumably, a "decision" could have been an acquittal. Despite this, the
Supreme Court looked at the supplemental instruction "in its
context and under all the circumstances" to find that there was
a coercive effect.88 But, the Court did not indicate whether inclusion of the magic words would by themselves cause the supplemental instruction to be upheld.
However, in Jenkins the Supreme Court did establish the
test for reviewing an Allen charge in the Ninth Circuit; whether
in its context and under all the circumstances there was a coercive effect. This was a departure from Hudson and prior Ninth
Circuit cases which appeared to look solely to the "magic words"
of admonishing jurors not to forgo honest convictions. 87
As expected though, the short instruction used in Jenkins
32. [d. at 157.
33. [d. at 158.

34.
35.
36.
37.

380 U.S. 445 (1965)(per curiam).
[d. 446.
[d.
Supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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gave rise to the next question: What if no supplemental instructions were given, but upon deadlock the district judge simply
sent the jurors back for further deliberation? In Walsh v.
United States,38 the Ninth Circuit answered this question by
finding that in such a case no juror coercion existed because no
jurors were singled out to change their views. 39 Jenkins was explicitly distinguished on this ground,40 albeit over a vociferous
dissent which argued that minority jurors were in effect singled
out because it was clearly implied that a guilty verdict was
required. 41
This gave rise to the next obvious question of whether the
timing alone of the supplemental instruction could be the basis
for reversing a guilty verdict. In Sullivan v. United States,42 the
question was sidestepped. An Allen charge which was given sua
sponte before any indication by the jurors that a deadlock had
been reached was upheld because it contained the magic
words. 43 The timing of the charge, with respect to it being given
sua sponte, was left unaddressed, apparently because the content had once again become the determinative factor in evaluating an Allen charge. 44 Yet only three years later, in Contreras v.
United States,46 where a sua sponte Allen charge was given, a
conviction was reversed on the basis that the charge was so premature it clearly coerced the resulting guilty verdict!6 While the
court declined to hold that an Allen charge was unduly coercive
per se and thereby prohibit its use in the Ninth Circuit,47 the
court did hold that where there was no indication of juror deadlock, an Allen charge should be used only where "clearly war38. 371 F.2d 135 (9th Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 915 (1967).
39. [d. at 136.
40. [d.

41. [d. at 137, (Browning, J., dissenting)(arguing that where it is implied that the
jury must reach a verdict, jurors relinquish their personal views in the interest of
unanimity).
42. 414 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1969).
43. [d. at 717.
44. [d. at 717-19.
45. 463 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1972)(per curiam).
46. [d. at 775.
47. The power of the circuit court to prohibit the use of Allen-type charges would
come under the federal courts' supervisory powers to formulate procedual rules. See
United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983)(federal courts may formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the constitution or Congress).
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ranted."48 Arguably "clearly warranted" would mean nothing
less than jury notification to the court that they had actually
reached a stalemate.
With the inconsistencies rendered by the Court of Appeals
and the myriad of different factual nuances that could be confronted in any given case where supplemental instructions were
used, by 1976 the district courts of the Ninth Circuit were trying
a new approach. This involved including an instruction which
encouraged the jurors to reach a verdict as part of the original
instructions. 49 The language used was essentially that approved
in Allen, containing the "magic words" which cautioned all jurors to reconsider their views but not to forgo honest convictions. Also, by giving the instruction initially instead of after a
48. Contreras, 463 F.2d at 774.
49. The Ninth Circuit not only permitted but in fact encouraged district courts to
send a copy of the instructions into the jury room for use during deliberations. Although
in doing so it was imperative that all proper instructions be included. Leaving out an
essential instruction would invite error. See e.g., United States v. Miller, 546 F.2d 320
(9th Cir. 1976). In Miller, it was stated:
Based upon experiences as a trial lawyer in state and federal
courts and shared experiences with trial lawyers, judges and
jurors, this author is firmly of the opinion that sending all instructions to the jury room at the commencement of deliberations is manifestly sound. It would serve to prevent claims of
error and reversals of this nature. Jurors would not be left to
their own conflicting memories as to the precise and important
wording of the instructions. It eliminates the danger of overemphasizing a few instructions or aspects of the case when requests for rereading are received and granted. The danger of
the jury seizing upon one instruction as stating the law of the
case or of seizing upon an erroneous view of what the instructions as a whole were meant to convey is infinitely greater
when jurors are left to their memories. We do (and properly
so) rely on jurors to follow instructions on the law of the case
and not to select one as stating the law, but to consider them
as a whole. The fulfillment of this admonition and objective is
greatly enhanced when the jury is afforded "the right" to have
the instructions with them during deliberations. Where, as
here, there are numerous general rules, complicated conspiracy
and substantive count instructions and the jury is in recess for
an extended period, the danger of a miscarriage of justice
based upon a faulty recollection of the instructions is inherent.
That danger is eliminated by giving the jury the 'keys' to a
proper result based on the facts they find to exist in a given
case.
[d. at 324 n.3. See also United States v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 1981)("It is
the better practice to include a version of [the Allen instruction] in the jury's original
instructions. ").
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stalemate was reached, it was thought that jurors would reexamine their positions without being coerced into arriving at a guilty
verdict. llo In this way an Allen charge as an original instruction
would offer the best of both worlds-causing unanimity without
causing coercion upon jurors in the minority.
Problems with this approach soon arose. The most recurrent
being how to respond to the jurors' deadlock when they vociferously described it, such as a jury's notice to the court that it was
"hopelessly deadlocked," and what to do when a jury became
deadlocked despite an Allen charge being used as part of the
original instructions.
The vociferousness of a particular response by a jury when
it had reached deadlock was evaluated in United States v. Peterson,lIl where after one-half day of deliberation the jurors reported, "we are deadlocked. "112 The district court returned the
jury for further deliberation. After a second day of deliberation
the jury again reported it was "hopelessly deadlocked."113 At this
point an Allen-type charge was given. That same afternoon a
guilty verdict was returned. II. In affirming the conviction, the
Ninth Circuit applied the "general standard" to determine
whether the Allen charge was coercive considering "all circumstances of the case."1I1I Finding no coercion, the circuit court specifically held that a jury's expression of being "hopelessly deadlocked" was not determinative. liS
This rule appears to be beyond dispute. No matter how emphatic the jury's expression that it is deadlocked ll7 and presuma50. See e.g., United States v. Miller, 546 F.2d 320, 324 (9th Cir. 1976)(because the
district court on Monday morning reread instructions given Friday afternoon but neglected to reread the instruction cautioning that an accomplice's testimony must be
weighed with great care, reversible error resulted).
51. 549 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1977).
52. Id. at 659.
53.Id.
54.Id.
55.Id.
56.Id.
57. See e.g., United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1977)(Seawell I). In
Seawell I, the jury informed the court: "[tJhe jury is at a ten-to-two impasse. The two
state that nothing we can say will convince them otherwise." [d. at 1160. The district
court gave an Allen charge with the jury returning a second note stating in part:
No amount of argument has persuaded their convictions, these
are the others who do not agree with the majority of the ju-

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 8

84

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:75

bly even if it reveals the numerical breakdown of the jurors'
votes, this will not in itself require a later guilty verdict to be
overturned. However, when a jury's response is particularly emphatic, it could be argued that this is a substantial factor to be
evaluated in determining coerciveness.
A restriction on use of the Allen charge is the finding of
coercion where the charge was given more than once. But multiple use of the charge mayor may not include use of the Allen
charge as part of the original instruction. For example, in
United States v. Seawell/'s an Allen charge was given when impasse was reached after two and one-half hours of deliberation.
When over three more hours of deliberation failed to result in a
verdict, the charge was reread to the jury.IIP The result was a
guilty verdict one hour later.so In reversing the conviction, the
appellate court held that using the Allen charge twice was an
unwarranted expansion of its use. S1 This holding was based on
the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury, but review of
the charge was still made under the Jenkins test of "all the circumstances," which included the content and timing of the
charge. 52 However, the court failed to further address the issue
of multiple use of the Allen charge and analyze whether use of
the charge as part of an original instruction would constitute
multiple use thereby requiring reversal of a guilty verdict.
rors. We therefore submit to you that we are at impasse and
are not likely to change our minds until fatigue becomes a deciding factor which we believe is neither fair to the defendant
or the people.
Id. See also United States v. Bonam, 772 F.2d 1449, 1450 (9th Cir. 1985)(jury note saying, "At this time, we the jury are unable to reach a unanimous verdict" and a second
note four hours later saying, "We the jury are at a stalemate and opinion cannot be
altered. The situation has not changed since 11:00 a.m. Nothing is going to change.
Please advise."); United States v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 883 (9th Cir. 1983)(after denying
dismissal of one juror, a second note from the jury stated, "Another juror wants to be
released. We seem to be at a standoff, and she feels that there is no clear end in sight."),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984); United States v. Hooton, 662 F.2d 628, 636 (9th Cir.
1981)(juror note to the court stated, "Please send us home. Some of us have family obligations, i.e., children at home alone."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1004 (1982); United States
v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1265 (9th Cir. 1981)(jury stated it was "having problems");
United States v. Cassasa, 588 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1978)(jury reported it was at a
"standstill"), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979).
58. 550 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1977)(Seawell I).
59. Id. at 1162.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1163.
62.Id.
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When Seawell was retried, an Allen charge was again used
before a verdict could be reached. 63 The conviction on retrial
was allowed to stand. 64 Finding Jenkins controlling, use of the
Allen charge was found not to be error per se, and without the
"unusual circumstances of coercion," the verdict was upheld. 611
But, an emphatic concurrence called for the demise of the Allencharge circuit-wide. 66
Subsequent cases followed suit. Without a showing of "unusual circumstances" of coercion, use of the Allen charge was
upheld. 67 Primary importance was therefore placed on the con63. United States v. Seawell, 583 F.2d 416, 417 (9th Cir.)(Seawell IJ), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 991 (1978).
64. ld. at 418.
65. ld.
66. ld. at 419, (Hug, J., concurring)(Judge Hug argued that an Allen charge was
unduly coercive regardless of its timing, and also that the charge misstated the law insofar as it indicated a second trial would be necessary if a verdict could not be reached.
But, feeling constrained by existing case law, Judge Hug felt compelled to concur in the
result absent reversal of the established case law by the court sitting en banc).
Other judges have also voiced their regret in upholding Allen charges. See e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 654 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 1981)(Merrill, J., concurring)(cautioning that some Allen charges sound like a reproof to the jury for ending in a
deadlock), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982); Beattie v. United States, 613 F.2d 762, 766
(9th Cir.)(Browning, C.J., concurring)(suggesting that the line between admonishing the
jury to keep trying and encouraging jurors to surrender their beliefs is extremely fine),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980). At least three other circuits had disapproved modified
Allen charges. See United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417 (3rd Cir.)(Alien charge
constitutes an unwarranted judicial invasion into the province of the jury), cert. denied
sub nom Panaccione v. United States, 396 U.S. 837 (1969); United States v. Brown, 411
F.2d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 1969)(Allen charge allowed if it is consistent with the ABA recommended standards), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970); United States v. Thomas, 449
F.2d 1177, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1971)(Allen charge must contain the same language as the
ABA approved instruction). However, in light of Lowenfield v. Phelps, 108 S.Ct. 546
(1988), use of the Allen charge is now authoritatively established. See infra note 79 and
accompanying text.
67. See Bonam v. United States, 772 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1985)(upholding charge
which said a juror should not abandon his conscientiously held views); Armstrong v.
United States, 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding "mild" Allen charge), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982); Guglielmine v. United States, 598 F.2d 1149 (9th
Cir.)(approving ABA Standard Instruction), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1974); Weiner v.
United States, 578 F.2d 757 (9th Cir.)(per curiam)(modified Allen charge allowed), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978); Silla v. United States, 555 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1977)(use of
Allen charge upheld under version given in Devitt & Blackmar). Under Seawelll, the
only "unusual circumstance" sufficient to overturn a conviction in which an Allen charge
was used, was repeated use of the instruction. However, a question remains on the use of
anA lien-type charge as part of the original instructions, which is then used again as a
supplemental instruction. Original and supplemental use only once would have required
reversal under Seawell I but presumably not under Lowenfield. See infra note 87 and
accompanying text.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 8

86

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:75

tent as opposed to the context of the charge. The Supreme
Court then re-addressed the use of the Allen charge and authoritatively established the current standard by which it is to be
evaluated.
II. THE LOWENFIELD v. PHELPS DECISION
With the circuit courts taking divergent views on the application of Allen,B8 the Supreme Court decided to review the continuing validity of the case. In Lowenfield v. Phelps,B9 the Court
upheld a modified Allen instruction and thereby reaffirmed the
use of supplemental instructions which urge jurors to arrive at a
unanimous decision. 70
The facts of Lowenfield are unique and give rise to questions which will arise in light of the existing Ninth Circuit case
law. Lowenfield was charged with five counts' of murder. 71 A
guilty verdict was reached. The jury then commenced sentencing
deliberations, prior to which the district court admonished the
jurors to consider the views of others with the objective of reaching a verdict, but that they should not surrender their own honest beliefs in doing SO.72 The following day the jury notified the
court that it was unable to reach a decision on the appropriate
penalty.73 The trial court then took an anonymous poll of the
jury to determine the usefulness of further deliberations on the
sentence. The poll revealed that eight jurors were in favor of further deliberations." Accordingly, the court directed further deliberation to determine the appropriate sentence. Later, the jurors notified the court that they had misunderstood the polling
question. The trial court again anonymously polled the jurors to
get their views on whether further deliberations would be helpful. 7G Only one juror answered affirmatively. The court then rein68. See, e.g., Williams v. Parke, 741 F.2d 847, 850 (6th Cir. 1984)(variation of the
charged used in Allen imperils the validity of the verdict), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1029;
United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir. 1971) (Allen charge should be used
with great caution and only when absolutely necessary).
69. 108 S. Ct. 546 (1988).
70. [d. at 552.
71. [d. at 548.
72. [d. at 549.
73. [d.
74. [d.
75. [d.
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structed the jury with a modified Allen charge which stated in
part: "Do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and to
change your opinion if you are convinced you are wrong but do
not surrender your honest belief as to the weight and effect of
evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or
for the purpose of returning a verdict. "78 The jury resumed deliberations and thirty minutes later returned with a death sentence on three of the murder counts."
Lowenfield appealed the sentence on the ground the sentence was coerced out of the jury.78 The guilt determination itself was not similarly appealed. In reviewing Lowenfield's sentence, the Supreme Court relied on Jenkins and Allen, stating
that the validity of the use of supplemental instructions was
"beyond dispute."79 The test used for evaluating coercion was
whether the charge was "coercive in its content and under all
the circumstances. "80
In examining the facts, the Supreme Court found them insufficient to establish coercion. The Court particularly relied on
the anonymity of the jury poll, pointing out that the poll was
used to determine the usefulness of further deliberations as distinguished from a poll to determine the jurors' positions on the
sentence itself.81 Brasfield was specifically distinguished on the
ground that it involved a jury poll which had the purpose of determining how the jurors were divided on the merits as opposed
the determining whether the jurors thought further deliberations would be helpful. 82 Additionally, Jenkins was distinguished on the ground that it involved a supplemental instruction which did not contain the magic words urging the jurors not
to surrender an honest belief. 83 With respect to the fact that the
sentencing verdict was returned only 30 minutes after the sup76.Id.
77.Id.
78. Id. at 550.
79. Id. at 550-51.
80. Id. at 550.
81. Id. at 552.
82.Id.
83. Id. at 551, citing Jenkins. It should be noted that the eighth amendment challenge to the Allen charge made in Lowen/ield would not have arisen in a federal court
because the sentences for criminal defendants in federal courts are determined by a
judge and not a jury. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32; 18 U.S.C. § 3553.
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plemental charge was given, the Supreme Court reasoned that
the defense counsel's failure to immediately object to the sentence indicated that coercion was not readily apparent. 84
III. THE ALLEN CHARGE AFTER LOWENFIELD
Lowenfield will have significant implications on the supplemental instruction law of the Ninth Circuit. The greatest implication is that it authoritatively reaffirmed Allen and reestablished the standard for reviewing supplemental instructions
urging that a verdict be reached.

Additionally, Lowenfield addressed the coercion issue under
the due process clause as well as the eighth amendment. By
finding no fifth or eight amendment violations, there is no reason to believe the sixth amendment right to a fair trial would
require a different result. 811 However, the Supreme Court limited
the Lowenfield holding to the facts of the case, pointing out that
"other combinations of supplemental charges and polling [may]
require a different conclusion."88 Yet, given the facts involved in
Lowenfield, it is hard to imagine a more coercive set of circumstances than those involved in Lowenfield, other than the failure
to use the magic words in the supplemental charge. 87
The Lowenfield decision will also have implications upon
the repetitive use of supplemental instructions which urge the
jurors to reach a verdict. Lowenfield upheld use of supplemental
charges both to achieve a verdict and to determine the appropriate sentence. Therefore, using an Allen charge more than once
would presumably not amount to an unwarranted expansion of
84. Lowenfield, 108 S. Ct. at 552. Failure to object did not waive the issue on appeal.
However, for counsel practicing in the Ninth Circuit, objection should be made to preserve the alleged error for appeal. If there is a failure to object, reversal is required only
if the error constitutes plain error. United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 834 (9th Cir.
1986). Since Lowenfield held the supplemental instruction did not rise to a constitutional violation, plain error will not exist.
85. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
86. Lowenfield, 108 S. Ct. at 552.
87. See Lowenfield, 108 S. Ct. at 555-58, (Marshall, J., dissenting)(reciting a more
compelling version of the facts than that recited by the majority; including, inter alia,
the point that at the jury was instructed four times that failure to reach a verdict on the
sentence would automatically result in a life sentence).
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its use. 88 This is contrary to Seawell I which found that repeating an Allen instruction amounted to unconstitutional juror coercion. But, if the charge is repeated more than once during any
separate phase of the trial, Lowenfield could be substantially
distinguishable on this basis and Seawell I would arguably require reversaP9
With respect to jury polling, Lowenfield is consistent with
previous Ninth Circuit cases. If polling is done in a manner that
maintains anonymity, coercion will not be found. However, if the
division in the jury is revealed, particularly because of court inquiry rather than by the jurors' voluntary revelation, this circumstance should be sufficient to demonstrate coercion under
the Supreme Court's decision in Brasfield and analogous Ninth
Circuit decisions. 90
Other circumstances in which issues may arise in the context of a supplemental instruction were not addressed by the
Lowenfield court. The time period involved in Lowenfield between giving the supplemental instruction and the verdict was
thirty minutes. It is therefore possible that where the jury deliberates for an exceptionally short period of time after a supplemental instruction is given, i.e., thirty minutes or less, reversal
could result. Given this obtuse time line, future Ninth Circuit
cases are likely to focus on the different factors which implicate
the time-line drawing; such as the complexity of the case, the
total time spent on deliberations, the degree of finality in the
jury's communication with the court that it is deadlocked, and
whether the supplemental instruction is given sua sponte or
only after a deadlock is reached and the jury informs the court
that it is at stalemate.
While each of these facts can be argued in the course of an
Allen charge appeal, one thing is clear. With Lowenfield reaf88. Id.
89. Lowen/ield involved a supplemental instruction used during both the sentencing
phase and during the guilt phase, where the trial court stated, "I order you to go back to
the jury room and deliberate and arrive at a verdict." [d. at 557, (Marshall, J., dissenting). Ironically, previous Ninth Circuit case law would have required that the verdict be
invalidated because the instruction did not contain the magic words. However, the majority opinion did not analyze the supplemental instruction used during the guilt phase,
but limited its analysis to the instruction used during the sentencing phase of the trial.
90. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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firming the Jenkins test for review, when an Allen charge does
include the magic words of admonishing the jurors not to give
up an honest belief, per se reversal on the ground of juror coercion will be difficult to attain. If the magic words are used, many
separate facts showing juror coercion will have to exist so that
their cumulative effects can overcome an otherwise permissible
supplemental instruction. In short, content will predominate
over context.
The Allen charge is used because it is effective. It pushes
jurors to reach a verdict. Absent a showing of facts demonstrating that the will of individual jurors was compromised, a guilty
verdict in the Ninth Circuit which resulted from the use of a
properly worded Allen charge will be allowed to stand.
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